Mr. Chairman,

Mr. Secretary General,

Excellencies,

Distinguished Guests,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me begin by acknowledging the numerous achievements of the Finish Chairmanship-in-Office. And allow me to add my thanks, Mr. Chairman, for your hospitality, as we gather to take stock of what we have accomplished, and what still needs to be done.

I would also like to thank the outgoing member of the OSCE Troika, my dear friend Miguel Angel Moratinos for his notable efforts, and wish all success to Dora Bakoyannis in her capacity as the incoming Chairperson-in-office.

Mr. Chairman,

It is an honor and privilege to address the Sixteenth Ministerial Meeting of the OSCE in Helsinki, the city in which the noble foundations of our work as participating States was established in 1975.

The OSCE represents a unique forum—at once pan-European and Trans-Atlantic—in which participating States can coordinate their positions in the context of the broader European security agenda.

Its fundamental merit has been the establishment of principles and values expressed in political commitments that keep serving as a multi-dimensional framework for relations amongst its participating States. Serbia will proudly and consistently continue to promote them in the conduct of our foreign and domestic policies.

Mr. Chairman,

This brings me to the fact that amongst participating States, the Republic of Serbia has the highest number of registered refugees and IDPs. More than 200,000 Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia have become citizens of Serbia, while another 74,000 remain registered refugees. Another 200,000 Serbs from Kosovo remain IDPs in northern and central Serbia.

I must underline that a sustainable and dignified solution to these issues cannot be found without full restitution of, or compensation for, seized or destroyed property.

The Republic of Serbia fully expects that the authorities in neighboring countries, such as Croatia, as well as those in our province of Kosovo, fulfill their obligations on these issues.

Mr. Chairman,

In pursuit of fuller regional cooperation, the Republic of Serbia has consistently advocated the strengthening of cooperation between the region’s OSCE Missions.

The Palić, Ohrid and Sarajevo Processes are perfect examples of how the OSCE can assist countries to solve issues that are by their very nature regional in scope—and that, as such, require solutions that are themselves regional.

We do not believe that the Sarajevo Process—to which we attach particular importance—has been completed. This important regional question requires not only a regional answer, but also the continuing active involvement of the three international stakeholders to the Sarajevo Process: the UNHCR, the EU, and of course the OSCE.

Mr. Chairman,

I now turn to more geo-strategic considerations.

My country believes that the OSCE can and should position itself to better respond to the growing number of challenges we all face. This ought to include engagement at the Heads of State level.

Events of this past year in the OSCE space have made it clear that it is time for the participating States to engage each other in a frank and open dialogue about inclusive ways to bolster security in the 21^st century. I believe it is our duty to forge ahead with ideas and proposals designed to strengthen the implementation of the basic principles of our Organization.

All constructive initiatives which aim to bring us closer to such an achievement are laudable, and should to be encouraged. We acknowledge, in particular, the commendable efforts of Presidents Medvedev and Sarkozy to take the lead in proposing concrete steps in the direction of improving European security within the framework of the OSCE.

The Republic of Serbia strongly supports the enhancement of dialogue. My country played a crucial role in advancing what began here, in this city, more than thirty years ago, by bridging often intractable positions before and during the First CSCE Follow-up Meeting that took place in Belgrade. Today, Serbia is again determined to play an active part in the modernization of the agenda of peace, security and cooperation in Europe.

Mr. Chairman,

2008 has been the hardest year of Serbia’s political transition. Despite overwhelming odds, our democracy was strengthened, and our European perspective was advanced.

The reasons are myriad. But the strategic cause lies in the conscious choice we made to respond diplomatically, and with maximal restraint, to the direct assault on our sovereignty and territorial integrity—in direct violation of our Constitution, the UN Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act, and against the will of the Security Council.

Mr. Chairman,

The way Serbia reacted to the February 17^th unilateral declaration of independence by the ethnic Albanian authorities in our southern province of Kosovo and Metohija, is a testament to the bedrock dedication of our democratic leadership to the peaceful and consensual resolution of disputes.

Through our actions and initiatives, we showed the region and the world that we are an indispensable anchor of stability and security in Southeast Europe.

I give you two examples.

Firstly: it is true that bilateral relationships have been burdened by the decisions of some countries to recognize UDI. However, we worked hard to compartmentalize the negative consequences that rose to the surface as a result of differences on Kosovo’s status. We opted for a non-confrontational approach. We turned to the law.

On October 8^th, the General Assembly of the United Nations supported Serbia’s position by an overwhelming majority. It approved a resolution to refer the question of status to the International Court of Justice.

An issue of such fundamental importance and complexity—passionately involving all at once identity, boundaries, communal rights, opposing historical narratives—has been steered clear of resorting to the force of arms for the first time in the history of our region.

Mr. Chairman,

The second example revolves around the fact that tremendous pressure was applied on the United Nations after UDI to commence the reconfiguration of the international presence in our southern province.

Unfortunately, this process was set in motion without the approval of the Republic of Serbia—the host country of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. And it was launched without the endorsement of the Security Council—the only institution endowed with the power to legitimate changes in the composition of the international presence in Kosovo.

This set the stage for a crisis of legitimacy.

The Republic of Serbia again led the way in showing the constructive way forward. We took it upon ourselves to build a bridge across the divide, and we succeeded.

Mr. Chairman,

I am glad that reconfiguration has been finally set aright. After months of dialogue, the United Nations and Serbia, in consultation with other stakeholders, came to an agreement on the framework of future operations in Kosovo. We also came to an understanding with the European Union on how Brussels will deepen its engagement in our southern province.

The achievement is greatly significant: it creates the conditions to protect the well-being of Serbs and other endangered communities in Kosovo. And it cements the fact that the Republic of Serbia remains indispensable to the self-governance of our southern province.

In the days and weeks to come, we expect to closely consult with the United Nations and the European Union on the implementation of the modalities and mechanisms of EULEX’s status neutral deployment in Kosovo.

Mr. Chairman,

In this context, I underscore Serbia’s longstanding position that the OSCE Mission in Kosovo—or OMIK—has the potential to play an important role in a reconfigured international presence.

Through the history of OMIK, the OSCE participating States have invested great efforts and resources to instill peace, stability and security into the fabric of Kosovo’s fractured and segregated society. We are all aware of the fact that this Mission’s future engagement represents one of the greatest challenges for the OSCE and its participating States. That is why we have conducted ourselves in a most constructive manner with regards to recent discussions about OMIK’s budget—and why I call on the participating States to support Serbia’s project proposal to establish Reception Centers throughout Kosovo designed to provide assistance to non-Albanian communities in need. It would be financed from this year’s OMIK budget surplus.

However, I must underline Serbia’s position that the work of the largest OSCE field mission leaves much to be desired. OMIK must fundamentally reassess its methods and tactics, as I noted in detail during my September 10^th address to the Permanent Council. I will not repeat myself here, yet I add that OMIK must play a more constructive role in property issues and in media-related matters, for example. And greater emphasis must be placed on OMIK fully conforming to the requirements of international law and its basic documents. OMIK must take its status-neutrality seriously. The failure of OMIK to fully implement its mandate is not an option.

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

If there is one thing I would like you to take away from my remarks today, it is that Serbia is a crucial player in the regional security we all have a stake in consolidating, and a proud democracy that has weathered enormous challenges against incredible odds.

We are confident that through the continued practice of a grand-strategy of partnership and engagement, Serbia—indivisible, democratic Serbia—shall become a member of the European Union in the next few years.

With our heads held high and our sovereignty preserved, Serbia will enhance its contribution to the comprehensive pursuit of lasting peace, security and cooperation in Europe.

Thank you very much.

Excellencies,

Dear Students,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me begin by thanking Professor Stefen Kipf and Dr. Gernot Erler for their kind words of introduction, and for their organization of this event.

Foreigners frequently begin conversations about Berlin with a reference to this city’s singular role in the Cold War. This is understandable. People from all parts of the world feel they can identify in a personal way with what took place here during the decades of division. It’s as if what happened in Berlin directly flowed into the universal current of history, touching us all, and thereby contributing somehow to our collective consciousness. That is why pictures of the Berlin Wall being torn down by ordinary Germans often flash before our eyes when this city’s name is invoked.

But I want to begin somewhere else. I want to turn for a moment to 1878 and to the unique significance that year holds—both for the history of Serbia, and for the history of bilateral relations between our two countries.

On July 13^th of that year, the Treaty of Berlin formally recognized the Principality of Serbia as the world’s 28^th fully sovereign state.

This would not have been possible without the statesmanship of Germany’s first Chancellor, Otto von Bismarck. Recognizing no direct advantage for Germany from events in the Balkans, and thus finding it useful to balance the interests of others in the region, Bismarck worked towards forging an agreement that greatly benefited Serbia.

Seeking to further the interests of his country in an increasingly self-interested, zero-sum international environment, Bismarck was tactically flexible in seeking to fulfill his overall strategic objective. His often misunderstood exclamation that the Balkans “were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier” is a case in point. Bismarck was not speaking disdainfully, but pragmatically. He meant that it was not in the German interest to go to war over the Balkans, but rather to strengthen the European peace—and this meant supporting Serbia.

My country took full advantage of the opportunity. Our delegation was led by one of my predecessors as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jovan Ristic—one of Serbia’s most distinguished statesmen. A devoted student of Leopold von Ranke, the most influential historian of the 19^th century and a former professor at this institution, Ristic worked with Bismarck to ensure that Serbia became an integral part of the constellation of European sovereign states.

In short, it was in Berlin that Serbia comprehensively reasserted its rightful place in the European family of nations—in large part thanks to the combined efforts of two notable alumni of this great university: Otto von Bismarck and Jovan Ristic.

So it is with great pleasure that I stand here before you, the first Serbian Minister of Foreign Affairs to address Berlin’s Humboldt University.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The founder of this great institution, Wilhelm von Humboldt, often wrote about how education could bring our common human nature to the surface. He reflected on the combination of an individual’s natural attachment to what is “strictly his own” together with a curiosity, a “longing”—to use his words—“about the unknown but which is in common.” He wrote of the “bond of humanity deeply rooted in the innermost nature of man”, and ascribed to us all a quality that ensured we were “spared from an exclusive attachment to the present.”

This essential duality of man between the particular and the universal has achieved a sort of synthesis-in-the-making in our time, and in our lands. It is the European Union—a new political form defined as more than an alliance, and less than a country, that looks beyond its present towards a common future. It is a grand project worthy of the legacy bequeathed to us by its founders—such as Robert Schuman, another alumnus of Humboldt University—who had every expectation that the nations of the Old Continent would build it up into something truly worthy of their vision of the fraternity of Europe.

In my view, what has become the European Union is the result of two equally important realizations.

The first centers on the growing awareness that unless the countries of Europe learn to speak with one voice on the international stage of the 21^st century, each would gradually slide towards inconsequence in a world that is at once becoming more inter-dependent and less coherent. In the European context, this has meant the rejection of hegemonic ambitions of individual states, in favor of a binding commitment to overcome challenges and disagreements by democratic means, rooted in law and custom, on the basis of a communitarian approach to a common future.

The second revolves around a tradition of shared values, rooted in a common philosophical fountainhead, developed over more than two millennia. These European values have come to include representative democracy, individual rights, juridical due process and the rule of law, minority protection, social justice, a free press, religious freedom, marketplace competition—and, after having too many wars fought on the bloodied soil of the continent, an overwhelming emphasis on soft power in conflict resolution.

In my view, the political consequences of these two realizations are what make the noble construct that is the European Union more than the mere sum of its sovereign parts.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Never in the history of our country have we had a more pro-European administration than that of President Boris Tadic. Never have we been more dedicated. And never have we been more able to commence the sprint to the finish line of Europe.

Rapid EU accession is the central strategic priority of the Republic of Serbia.

We have fully embraced the values of Europe. We believe they constitute the intangible greatness of the Union we seek to join. They form the foundation of our democracy, and our efforts at reconciliation.

But also—and perhaps most importantly—they provide us cause to build on the dignity of our past, while giving voice to our belief in what we can accomplish in the future.

And what is of great significance is that my country’s absolute dedication to join the EU is shared by all the countries of the Western Balkans. Europe, in other words, has become the unifying force of the region. Should the process of enlargement be successfully completed, I believe that the entire region can be propelled generationally forward. The Balkanization of the Balkans would not only be reversed, but buried once and for all.

Why then has this not happened? Why are we not closer? Why isn’t a sense of imminent belonging being felt throughout the region—and especially in Serbia? Why is there a creeping feeling that an opportunity is about to be missed—the best regional opportunity to come along in this generation to complete the European project in the Western Balkans?

My answer revolves around the distinct impression that prevails in our public that we are not being treated like other EU membership aspirants in the Western Balkans. We seem to be held to a different set of standards.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It seems like it is not just the Copenhagen Criteria—an objective standard of technical and political achievement we are well on our way to fulfilling ahead of schedule.

It is also the way the ICTY issue has been handled. Reconciliation is a cornerstone value of Europe, so it is natural that full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has become an additional requirement for all the countries of the Western Balkans on the road to membership.

Just so we are absolutely clear: the Republic of Serbia has demonstrated time and again its fundamental commitment to the EU accession process by fully cooperating with the ICTY. And we will continue to do so. There is no doubt about that.

Unfortunately, some see this as not enough. Only in the case of Serbia has the definition of “full cooperation” become harsher over time. We have come to notice that the goalposts kept shifting. The conditionality has increased, and full cooperation with the Tribunal has been redefined: total compliance has come to mean delivering Mladic—even though it is evident to just about everyone that Serbia is doing everything it can to deliver him to the Hague.

Let me illustrate the situation in which we find ourselves with this anecdote: A few days after the current Serbian government was confirmed by Parliament, an operation was undertaken to arrest and hand-over Radovan Karadzic—we acted swiftly on intelligence we had just gotten. The reaction of one of my European colleagues less than 24 hours after this took place was deeply disappointing. He said to me: “Serbia had captured the wrong man.”

This has resulted in the truly ironic situation that the most pro-European government in the history of Serbia has effectively begun to deliver on most of its electoral promises, save the most important one: moving forward on EU integration.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

It does not end there. Sometimes we’re told of the reflections in certain corners that Serbia’s progress on EU accession ought to be linked to the issue of Kosovo.

This is not helpful, to say the least. For although we may profoundly disagree with some of our European friends on UDI, we believe that a diplomatic position of one or more EU member States must never be transformed into a political condition for Serbia’s European accession to go forward. Bilateral relationships have been burdened by decisions to recognize the forcible secession of a part of our country, it is true. But no such burden exists in the case of the European Union, which has taken a principled position of status neutrality—one confirmed by this past Wednesday’s Security Council session on the deployment of EULEX to our southern province.

This is the right policy, and it must be maintained.

Let me be very clear on this point: any attempt to connect UDI recognition to an EU membership perspective would result in what I trust none of us want—the instantaneous halt to Serbia’s accession process.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

A strategic opportunity is before us. Favorable opinion for the EU in Serbia is today at an all-time high. But if we don’t move forward, then I am afraid that we could look back to the end of 2008 as the peak of Euro-enthusiasm in Serbia. We must start passing through clearly marked signposts along the road to Brussels—and we must do so rapidly. This is a strategic imperative. Otherwise, the prospect of a generation to consolidate the gains already made in the Western Balkans could fall to the wayside.

What is needed, therefore, is a roadmap for accession success.

Let 2009 become Serbia’s leap year, our year of European achievement. Let us work together to create that all-important sense of regional imminent belonging to the House of Europe.

Here is what I propose.

First, let us restore a common-sense understanding of what full cooperation with the ICTY really means, and un-freeze the Interim Agreement between Serbia and the European Union by the end of this year.

Second, let Serbia be put on the White Schengen List next year—for freedom of movement, the right to travel visa-free, is an embodiment of what Europe is to ordinary citizens of my country. And third, let 2009 be the year we commence the constructive management of Serbia’s application process, and achieve Official Candidacy Status.

One; two; three. Let’s just do these three things—together, as partners aiming at a common future. I repeat: Serbia will do its part if we are freed from out-of-date perceptions. I invite you to watch just how fast we can go.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I come to a now-famous speech before this very university by your then sitting Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer. On May 12^th, 2000, he asked “Quo vadis Europa?” And he answered, “Onwards to the completion of European integration. A step backwards,” he added, “even just standing still in contentment with what has been achieved, would demand a fatal price of all EU member States and of all those that want to become members.” He concluded: “it would demand a fatal price above all of our people, for enlargement is a supreme national interest, especially for Germany.”

I am under no illusions that my remarks to you this afternoon will achieve the level of recognition that Joschka’s did.

That said, I would be satisfied if you took away just this one thing from my remarks to you today: Serbia is a proud democracy, absolutely dedicated to consolidating regional peace and stability—that views achieving membership in the European Union as being in our ‘supreme national interest.’

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I began my remarks to you this afternoon with Bismarck and 1878, and spoke of some of his accomplishments and limitations. I end with a brief consideration of what the Europe of the 21^st century can truly become.

The EU whole, free and at peace—incorporating everything from the Baltics to the Balkans, Scandinavia to Iberia, the North Sea to the Black Sea—will turn out to be the magnificent answer to the until-now irrevocably unstable relationship between power and legitimacy in the long history of the Old Continent. Here is why:

We Europeans have learned over the course of many bloody centuries that unconstrained power failed to be a reliable guide to European order. Equally, we have discovered that equilibrium yields best results if it predicated on common values.

In the past, the balance of power, in its zero-sum way, limited without preventing the capacity to overthrow the European order. Today and in the future, the unconditional embrace of shared values works to preclude even the desire to undermine, much less overthrow, the emerging 21^st-century European order.

Hard power without legitimacy tempts tests of strength that lead to friction or conflict. The world of today is coming to the realization that legitimacy without power still tempts empty posturing, while inviting derision from the more fierce.

In my view, the European Union is poised to combine these various elements of statecraft into a sublime whole that is more than the sum of its parts—but only if all the parts are there to be combined in a prudent, statesmanlike way. Serbia is one such part—essential to the consolidation of success that will be the European project once completed. There it stands, right around the corner: the torch to illuminate the 21^st-century’s international landscape—waiting to be seized for the supremely moral prize that it is, anticipating the political achievement that it can easily become, and longing to be the success that it was always destined to be.

That is the Europe and the Serbia we seek, we embrace, and we build: the prudent synthesis of a nation’s natural attachment to what is ‘strictly its own’, together with ‘longing for that which is unknown but held in common’—to paraphrase the immortal words of Wilhelm von Humboldt.

Thank you very much for the opportunity you have given me to share my vision of Serbia’s European time with you this afternoon.

United Nations Security Council
New York, 26 November 2008

ADDRESS BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
BY H.E. MR. VUK JEREMIĆ
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE REPUBLIC OF SERBIA

Mr. President,
Special Representative Zannier,
Excellencies,
Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am glad to be taking part in one of those occasions in which the errors of the past, carried out in the name of bare political expediency, can begin to be set aright through a series of acts characterized by strategic foresight, vision, and prudence.

We have the chance to engage in a common effort to attenuate the effects of a serious challenge to the foundations of the international system that took place on February 17th, 2008. On that day, the ethnic Albanian authorities of Serbia’s southern province of Kosovo and Metohija unilaterally declared independence from a member State of the United Nations—in direct violation of its democratic Constitution, and against the will of the Security Council.

Mr. President,

In all the sessions of the Security Council devoted to our southern province, Serbia has insisted upon the full respect of the binding obligations of the United Nations Charter, as well as this Council’s Resolution 1244 (1999), which guarantees the sovereignty and territorial integrity of my country.

I make no apology for this. I celebrate the fact that Serbia is unwavering in its determination to peacefully defend its principled position on Kosovo—using all political, diplomatic, and legal means at our disposal. We will continue doing so in the future.

I would like to take this opportunity to thank all the member States of the United Nations that support Serbia’s position on Kosovo’s UDI—the first among these valiant equals being the Russian Federation. Our nations stand together, dedicated to safeguarding the principles set forth in the UN Charter.

Mr. President,

Serbia’s insistence on resolving Kosovo’s future status in accordance with international law has not only been invoked for reasons of vital national interest and constitutional necessity; nor merely out of genuine care for regional peace and stability. We have also done so out of fundamental concern for the dangerous consequences the Kosovo precedent could bring to the survival of the United Nations system as we know it.

We hold that the argument that Kosovo is sui generis—in other words, a unique case—is untenable. The sui generis contention comes down to saying that Kosovo should be treated as an exception to international law—that Kosovo should stand beyond the rules that govern the behavior of the international community.

The Republic of Serbia strongly rejects this claim, believing that no one should permit himself the right to proclaim such exceptions, especially in defiance of the Security Council.

Serbia’s position has remained consistent: the only way to avoid challenging the territorial integrity of any UN member State is for the world community to work constructively together to solve this issue through international institutions of indisputable and universal legitimacy.

On October 8th, the General Assembly of the United Nations supported Serbia’s position by an overwhelming majority. It approved a resolution to refer the question of status to the International Court of Justice.

Thanks to this support, an issue of such fundamental importance and complexity—passionately involving all at once identity, boundaries, communal rights, opposing historical narratives—has been steered clear of resorting to the force of arms for the first time in the history of our region.

Mr. President,

Relegating this to the judicial arena was a re-affirmation by the world community of Serbia’s strategic choice to respond to UDI peacefully, and with maximal restraint.

It is the first in a series of steps designed to create an environment in which lasting stability can be secured, law strengthened, and sovereign equality reinforced.

The second involves restoring legitimacy to international action in our southern province.

On June 12th, the Secretary General issued a report in which he informed the Security Council of his intention to begin reconfiguring the international civilian presence in Kosovo. This was done without the approval of the Republic of Serbia—the host country of the United Nations Mission in Kosovo. And it was done without the endorsement of the Security Council—the only institution endowed with the power to legitimate changes in the composition of the international presence in Kosovo, as paragraphs 5 and 19 of resolution 1244 (1999) make abundantly clear.

Ignoring the will of Serbia—and infringing on the statutory prerogatives of the Security Council—set the stage for a crisis of legitimacy.

Just as with UDI, the Republic of Serbia responded in a non-confrontational manner. On July 25th, we addressed the Council to repeat our position that it is of “crucial importance for reconfiguration to proceed with the full engagement of Serbia. It must be completed with our acceptance, and supported by the Security Council. Such is the only way,” we concluded, “to deliver legitimacy and ensure the sustainability of our work.”

Mr. President,

The point was clear: the voice of Serbia must be respected.

On that basis, an understanding with the Secretary General was reached in which a dialogue between Serbia and the United Nations would intensify on six topics of mutual concern—namely police, judiciary, customs, transportation and infrastructure, administrative boundaries, and Serbian patrimony.

After months of difficult negotiations, I am pleased to say that an agreement has been reached. Its provisions are detailed in the report we have before us. This dialogue will continue. I assure you that Serbia will remain constructive in the ongoing dialogue with the United Nations, while holding to its principled position on Kosovo, rooted in our country’s Constitution and resolution 1244.

Our present achievement is greatly significant: it creates the conditions to protect the well-being of Serbs and other gravely endangered communities in Kosovo. And it cements the fact that the Republic of Serbia remains indispensable to the self-governance of our southern province.

Mr. President,

Serbia’s longstanding position of support for the deepening of the European Union’s engagement in any part of Serbia, including Kosovo, has never been at issue.

The European Union can and should help to build the much needed institutional and societal fabric of our southern province. This has been impossible until now because of the way reconfiguration began.

What has always been a crucial condition for our acceptance of reconfiguration is a clear and binding commitment by the European Union—confirmed in the Security Council—to be fully status neutral, and completely anchor its presence in Kosovo under the authority of the United Nations, in conformity with resolution 1244 (1999).

I am pleased that these reasonable conditions have been met. The explicit language of the report confirms the status neutrality of EULEX’s engagement, which is a guarantee that no part of its mandate can be devoted to the implementation of the Ahtisaari Plan for Kosovo’s independence—rejected by the Republic of Serbia, and “never endorsed by the Security Council,” in the words of the report that is before us today.

The Republic of Serbia therefore welcomes the Secretary General’s report.

Mr. President,

I must confess my disappointment at the position that the authorities in Pristina have taken on the Secretary General’s report.

What is of great significance, however, is that the implementation of the six points—as well as the deployment of EULEX that, to quote the report, “will fully respect resolution 1244 and operate under the overall authority and within the status-neutral framework of the United Nations”—shall nonetheless be put into operation. And that it shall be done in consultation with relevant stakeholders, such as the Republic of Serbia.

I call on the authorities in Pristina neither to obstruct the will of the international community, nor to oppose the binding resolve of the Security Council.

Mr. President,

I take the opportunity to draw the Council’s attention to the difficult environment in which the most endangered community in Europe continues to live. For many Serbs in Kosovo, their fate continues to depend on how they feel they can survive despite the enormous hostility of their immediate surroundings.

The representative of the Kosovo Albanians is present today in his personal capacity. In his previous remarks to this Council, a claim has been made that Kosovo is an idyllic, multi-ethnic place where democratic perfection is just around the corner.

I therefore invite the Council to consider the following:

What of the abominable act of cultural cleansing that is the paving over of the ruins of the recently destroyed Serbian church in the center of Djakovica—thus compounding physical destruction with the attempt to erase every trace of its very existence?

What of the defiance of the municipal authorities in Decane to restore the cadastral record of land belonging to the monastery of Visoki Decane, a UNESCO World Heritage Site that has been placed on its List of World Heritage in Danger—notwithstanding two Executive Decisions by the SRSG ordering them to do so?

What of the return of illegally-seized private property? More than 30,000 such cases are outstanding. Those affected—Kosovo Serbs overwhelmingly—barely manage in make-shift dwellings or IDP camps, while Kosovo Albanians continue to live in their homes and make use of their agricultural fields—without fear of prosecution.

What of the fact that only one hundred and seven Kosovo Serb IDPs—according to the UN’s numbers—have returned to their homes in the first nine months of this year?

What of the break-in of the Kosovo Trust Agency compound by officials of the parallel institution known as the Privatisation Agency of Kosovo, done in the presence of local police?

What of the seizure of massive quantities of medicine and medical equipment destined for North Kosovo or the enclaves?

What of the most recent stoning of Serbs in Kosovska Mitrovica, and the use of automatic weapons by ethnic Albanians against unarmed Serbian civilians and international police?

And, finally, what of the repeated assaults on international civilian officials in Kosovo?

These and many other similar questions are disturbing indeed. As member States of the United Nations, I believe it is our solemn duty to seek the answers to them.

Mr. President,

In conclusion, I say that the rapid realization of full membership in the European Union will continue to be the central strategic priority of the Republic of Serbia. This should also remain the priority of all other UN member States in the Western Balkans. For the caravan of history that began its journey with the Treaty of Rome will not stop. We must make sure that no one is left behind, as it goes by.

We have been very clear as to who we are and what we wanted. Serbia continues to believe in a shared destiny of all European nations. And we remain dedicated to embrace Robert Schuman’s dream of an “organized and living Europe indispensable to the maintenance of peaceful relations amongst states.”

These stand at the foundation of our democracy, our efforts at reconciliation, and our beliefs in what we can accomplish together. They remind us of the importance of cooperation, compromise and consensus-building, while prompting us to remain true to the moral compass the values themselves provide to all who have the prescience to see beyond the first obstacle on the way.

Mr. President,

Serbia—whole Serbia, including Kosovo—will become a member of the European Union in the next few years.

We will join the European Union with our heads held high, with our territorial integrity intact, and with our sovereignty preserved.

Mr. President,

Like most other nations, mine has traveled through periods of tragedy, and periods of glory. Sometimes it is tragedy that produces the opportunity to achieve new heights. But these are not reached by simply inventing new history. That is why Serbia will never, ever accept the independence of Kosovo. New heights are achieved by honoring all that constitute one’s national identity, not denying it. New heights are achieved by nurturing heritage, not suffocating it. Achieving new heights is about a nation being proud of its past, while reaching beyond its present.

“The arc of the moral universe is long; but it bends towards justice,” Martin Luther King, Jr., once said, adding: “it comes to all in the end.”

So it has always been, so it is, and so it will be. And so will be Kosovo. Part of Serbia forever.
____

Thank you, Mr. President, for having given me the opportunity to address the Security Council at a time of great consequence for us all.

* * *

Excellencies,

Dear Students,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am proud to stand before the children of Hus, Comenius and Palacky. It was here that medieval theocracy’s stranglehold on politics, culture, and faith was first broken. It was here that the fight for spiritual liberty began, and here the first preparations for the modern development of Europe took place. It was also here that the “prison of nations”—in Edvard Beneš’s words—first began to be besieged.

And I am especially proud to be the first ever Minister of Foreign Affairs of Serbia to address Charles University—one of the oldest and most prestigious universities in Europe.

This cultural metropolis, this living, beating heart of Prague, was once defined as “škola slovena”, or the School of the Slavs, by the great Serbian scientist and alumnus of this venerable place, Nikola Tesla.

He too was a brainchild of the Czech lands—as were the countless other Serbs who came here in ever-growing numbers during the latter half of the 19^th and early parts of the 20^th centuries, seeking an education they felt only Charles University could provide. The catalyst for this educational migration was the Prague Slav Congress of 1849—at which a decision was reached to work together to liberate our respective nations from foreign rule. What was begun there continues to provide the thread that has woven a fabric of deep friendship and genuine understanding between our two peoples for more than one hundred and fifty years.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The overall goal of wave upon wave of Serb students at Charles University was simple: to become part of the vanguard that was to play a role in the full restoration and development of Serbian statehood. Like countless Czechs, they too walked in your libraries, sat in your classrooms, and listened to your teachers. Like your predecessors, they too were inspired by men such as Tomas Masaryk, a former Charles University professor and the first President of Czechoslovakia, who once wrote that “we shall always be a small minority in the world, but when a small nation accomplishes something with its limited means, what it achieves has an immense and exceptional significance. It is a deliberate and discerning love of a nation that appeals to me, for institutions by themselves are not enough,” he said.

They were inspired by his words, and took courage in his many deeds—as for example when he successfully defended 53 Serbs accused of treason by the Dual Monarchy in 1908, as a deputy in the Vienna parliament.

A towering figure of the 20^th century, Masaryk was a great friend of my nation who at one point, in 1915, even advocated a union between the Czech lands and Serbia—so close was the bond he felt existed between us.

This bond was forever cemented during the First World War. A few days ago was Armistice Day—the day we remember those gallant many who helped change and democratize the map of Europe forever. I was in London on that day. And as I stood in silence on the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month, I thought back to the shared sacrifice of our two nations to the cause of liberty in Europe. I thought back to the Czechoslovak Legion—to the volunteer military units composed of Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war—and to its origins in 1915 as a Serbian volunteer division on the eastern front. Tens of thousands of Czechs and Serbs fought and died together on numerous fields of battle against the Dual Monarchy, perhaps inspired by the memory of the Czech František Zah, my country’s first Chief of the General Staff and the founder of our Military Academy.

And I thought back to the alliance forged in war and consolidated in peace—to the Little Entente and the conviction of its founders that survival depended on coming together on the basis of democratic values, to defend against those who wished to deny our nations their rightful place in the European constellation.

Let us not forget that this was a time dominated by isolationist sentiment—a time of fear and uncertainty, of financial crisis and self-doubt. Oswald Spengler had proclaimed the Decline of the West, the Middle East was stirring, the established European democracies were both restless and timid, and a former World War One corporal was about to seize power in Berlin.

And yet statesmen such as Foreign Ministers Edvard Beneš in Prague and Bogoljub Jevtic in Belgrade did not waver. With the signing of the Pact of Organization of the Little Entente in 1933, they seized history by its reigns and tried valiantly to alter its course.

In a sense, these men of vision helped pave the way for the creation of the European Union decades later. Their failure was transformed over time into a success they could not have believed was ever possible.

And so we owe an immeasurable debt of gratitude to these and other Serbian and Czech forefathers of the post-war European project to secure the peace and deliver prosperity to what Jan Patočka once called the “sole rational civilization.”

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Today, we stand on the other side of those historical events. The peace has been largely secured, and Europe is no longer a place of great divisions. The European Union has become a strategic reality—a new political form in which a growing number of democratic countries freely pool their sovereignty to create something novel: an entity that is more than an alliance, and less than a country.

In a bitter twist of fate, our two nations were excluded from its early development. Yet we maintained our solidarity as much as the circumstances permitted. In 1968 for example, Belgrade played host to the largest demonstration anywhere in Europe against the suppression of the Prague Spring. In the 1970s and 1980s, we sheltered many Czech dissidents, and opened up our printing presses, theatres and concert halls to the artistic expression of resistance that helped to bring about the Velvet Revolution and, together with it, the renaissance of Europe.

The delayed enjoyment of what we helped to create perhaps helps to explain our complicated view of the European Union in the 21^st century.

We embrace the fact that there is no doubt the European project has, since its inception, built up its credibility by delivering lasting peace and sustainable prosperity. But the truth also is that decision-making has become overly bureaucratized, whilst recent efforts at reform have not yet born fruit. We feel that the noble construct of soft power that is the EU has entered into a seemingly profound crisis of confidence. Institutional malaise and enlargement fatigue are amongst the symptoms of the democratic deficit all of us are becoming too familiar with.

While sharing a constructive realism towards the EU, rooted in a common recollection of the sacrifices our nations have made to be counted amongst the sovereign states of the Old Continent, the perspective from which we gaze at what has become the European achievement is different.

The Czech Republic is a member of the EU, while Serbia is not there yet. I do not intend to enter into a long discussion of the reasons why we have not yet joined you in Brussels. I do wish to point out, however, the important political distinction between divorce and integration on the one hand, and conflict and division on the other.

What I would like to do for the remainder of my remarks is to focus on how we can draw on the deeds of our political ancestors to channel the present moment into a common future—how we can, in a sense, re-consecrate the special relationship and come together as sovereign equals in the House of Europe.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Serbian President Boris Tadic once said that “in politics, through a prudent determination of the end, we can change the situation. We can add something new to it, something of our own. For a small nation, this constitutes political statesmanship, political creation.” Quoting Masaryk, he added, “This is the poetry of life.”

It is to this poetry, to this promise of statesmanship, to which I now turn.

The Czech Republic will assume the Presidency of the European Union on January 1^st 2009. Some have expressed their deep concern. “Prague is not up to the challenge,” they say. Well, I think they’re wrong. I think they underestimate you. I think they wrongly dismiss the strength of your commitment to cementing the democratic gains the Czech nation was instrumental in delivering to all the peoples of Europe. And I think they downplay the dignity of your past, as you seek to reach beyond the present.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Czech Republic has made it clear that a priority of its EU Presidency will be the advancement of the membership perspective of the Western Balkans, with Serbia at its center. I truly welcome your commitment, and I want to tell you that I can think of no better country to deliver on the promise made at the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003, where the European future of the Western Balkans was first clearly stated.

When I say to you that Serbia is a country proud of its history, I think you know exactly what I mean. I think you instinctively understand how dedicated our democratic leadership is to pursuing policies that will propel the region generationally forward—and why the central strategic priority of the Republic of Serbia is rapid accession to the European Union.

Serbia wants to join the EU, not only for reasons of geography, heritage, and economic prosperity, but also because of the values we hold in common. These values constitute the intangible excellence of 21^st-century Europe, and they form the foundation of our democracy, our efforts at reconciliation, and our beliefs in what we can accomplish. They remind us of the importance of cooperation, compromise and consensus-building, while prompting us to remain true to the moral compass the values themselves provide to all who have the prescience to see beyond the first obstacle on the way.

What is also of great significance is that Europe has become the unifying force of the region: my country’s dedication to join the EU is shared by all the countries of the Western Balkans.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The point of no return is within reach. Let us have the courage, and the vision, to make it a reality. The Czech Presidency comes at precisely the right moment for us all. And let me assure you, Serbia will do its part. For never in the history of our country have we had a more pro-European administration than that of President Boris Tadic. Never have we been in a better position to deliver on our commitments. Never have we been more able to commence the sprint to the finish line of Europe.

And yet, there seems to be a creeping sense that an opportunity is about to be missed—the best regional opportunity ever to come along to complete the European project in the Western Balkans. Serbia is, unfortunately, not being treated like other EU membership aspirants in the region—despite the fact that we are its natural accession accelerator. We seem to be held to a different set of standards.

Don’t you just get the feeling that when some in the EU looks to Serbia, they say: sui generis—unique case? It’s not just the Copenhagen criteria, is it? A whole set of additional conditionalities are being unfairly imposed on us.

And this is where I believe the forthcoming Czech Presidency can play a crucial role. Prague can lead the way in ensuring the rapid fulfillment of Serbia’s European future—by helping us overcome the challenges we face, instead of perpetuating the creation of new obstacles for us to jump over.

It is high time to set aside out-of-date perceptions. The Interim Agreement must be un-frozen, so that Belgrade and Prague can work together with the rest of the EU to ensure that Serbia achieves Official Candidacy Status in 2009.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

If Europe fails to deliver on its promises to Serbia and the rest of the Western Balkans in the very near future, there is a real strategic danger that the destructive potential of the 1990s could be revived. If we are not very careful, the specter of Kosovo could return to center stage and haunt us all in the years to come, as our European membership perspective gets stuck in neutral gear.

We are already standing on very thin ice as it is.

On February 17^th, the ethnic-Albanian authorities in our southern province unilaterally declared their independence from Serbia—in blatant violation of our democratic Constitution, the UN Charter, and the Helsinki Final Act, as well as against the will of the Security Council, and the language of resolution 1244 (1999).

Kosovo’s ethnic Albanian leaders chose to take this unilateral step after walking away from the negotiating table.

They believed that if they walked away, the path to securing independence would open up before them. They believed it, because that’s what they were told. They believed it because an artificial deadline on the talks was affirmed from the outside after which, if no compromise solution was reached, Kosovo’s independence would be imposed.

Under such circumstances, a negotiated solution was never a realistic option. With a fixed deadline and a default position that fulfilled their dangerous demands, what incentive did Kosovo’s ethnic Albanians have to negotiate with Serbia in good faith? All they had to do was to pretend to engage in a process pre-determined to fail, and wait out the clock.

The incentives for compromise were far outweighed by the incentives for maximalism. The result was the rejection of Serbia’s reasonable offer of almost unrestricted self-government—the broadest possible autonomy one can imagine.

But there was another reason—one that struck a blow to the very core of the values of Europe.

Before, and especially during, the negotiations on status, the Kosovo Albanians threatened violence—against the Serbian community in Kosovo and against the international civilian presence tasked with administering the province. This threat was seen as credible. After all, they had carefully orchestrated and carried out a pogrom in March 2004 that killed a number of unarmed civilians and destroyed countless Serbian homes and businesses, as well as 35 churches and monasteries—including a number that were built in the 14^th century.

Instead of rejecting this fundamentally anti-European threat, some felt the need to give in—to capitulate. Instead of standing up to the bullies in Pristina, a decision was made to appease them.

And a grave commission of injustice against a young European democracy was the immediate result.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Serbia responded to Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence with utmost responsibility and restraint. Despite political turmoil, our country continued to work hard to contribute to maintaining regional stability.

From the very onset of this grave crisis, Serbia ruled out the use of force. And we did not exercise other unilateral options, such as the imposition of economic sanctions, against our breakaway province.

Instead, we opted for a peaceful and diplomatic approach to this attempt at forcible partition of our country—the result of which is that a vast majority of UN member States refrained from recognizing Kosovo’s UDI. They continued to abide by their UN Charter obligations to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of my country.

Serbia proposed a non-confrontational way to respond to the threat posed to its territorial integrity. We chose to use the law.

We asked of the General Assembly to refer the status issue to the International Court of Justice. And on October 8^th, the General Assembly agreed with Serbia’s position by an overwhelming majority.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

This did not please the Kosovo Albanian secessionists. So they turned again to the tactic that had worked so well for them in the past. Soon after February 17^th, they began to bully, and they began to threaten—more and more, as the realization that they could not achieve their goal began to sink in.

This all came to the fore a few days ago.

After months of difficult negotiations, an agreement was reached between Serbia and the United Nations on a number of issues of crucial importance for the survival of the Serbian community in Kosovo. This agreement had the explicit endorsement of all UN member States with a stake in the future status of Kosovo.

All had been agreed. A report by the UN Secretary General was to be submitted to the Security Council for approval. It would have legalized the European Union’s Law and Order Mission in Kosovo.

All had been agreed. EULEX was to be bound by the Security Council to be fully status neutral, as well as completely anchor its presence in Kosovo under the authority of the United Nations, in conformity with resolution 1244 (1999).

All had been agreed. A Security Council session had been scheduled for this past Tuesday. And then the bullying coming out of Pristina intensified. Unable to effectively oppose this turning point that has dealt a heavy blow to their secessionist ambitions, the Kosovo Albanian authorities overtly threatened violence and intimidation.

Instead of confronting this fundamental menace, instead of saying that such barbarous threats must not be tolerated, the Security Council session was cancelled, the Secretary General’s report was not published, and the values we hold in common were again held hostage to a hostile minority seemingly unwilling to enter the contemporary European mainstream.

____

When will we learn that passivity has no place in Europe? And when will we finally confront those who seek to destroy what so many generations of European have worked so hard to build?

Let me say to you clearly that the moment is now.

It is up to the EU to finally stand up to the extremists in Pristina and say to them: “this will not stand. Your rejection of the law will not be tolerated. And your threats will not be accepted.”

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Decisions reached in the next few days could be decisive. For its part, Serbia is deeply committed to remain a constructive partner. We are ready to engage with the United Nations—and with the European Union we very much want to join—in working through the details of their status-neutral role in Serbia’s southern province. And we are ready to cooperate with our partners to create the conditions for a compromise solution to the future status of Kosovo—one that would be acceptable to all stakeholders, and one that would accelerate, not derail, the entire region’s journey to Brussels.

But we cannot accept to be a part of a mollification strategy that gives in to extremist threats of violence and intimidation.

I conclude with the words of Franz Kafka, another alumnus of Charles University: “By believing passionately in something that still does not exist, we create it. The nonexistent is whatever we have not sufficiently desired.”

On behalf of the Republic of Serbia, I say to you: the time has come to create—to create a European Union that looks to the future with optimism, proud of its many identities, and secure of its prospects.

I say to you: the time has come to believe and act with the courage of our convictions.

And I say to you: the time has come for moral clarity, statesmanship, and justice to bolster the hearts of men and women throughout the House of Europe.

Thank you for your attention.

Deputy Prime Minister Djelic,

Excellencies,

Dear Friends,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me begin by singling out the leadership of Mrs. Sonja Licht and the Belgrade Fund for Political Excellence in advancing the cause, reputation and quality of the civil society sector in Serbia. Your many years of selfless service to our country and the entire region immeasurably helped us overcome the tumults of the 1990s and, in the wake of October 5^th, greatly facilitated the development of our democracy. We all owe you a debt of gratitude. Thank you very much.

____

We come together to discuss how to strengthen Serbia’s European perspective at a particularly delicate moment. A new geopolitical reality is emerging—and it is happening in ways and with a tempo few thought possible even a short while ago.

We use different terms to define it: the neo-polar world, the era of overlapping systems, the age of relative powers. But it all basically means the same thing: growing inter-dependence, increasing unpredictability, and accelerating tectonic shifts; greater challenges combined with new opportunities.

There are many reasons for all this, from climate change and terrorism, to the slowdown in democratic development and the easterly drift of the global balance of power. The recent tumults in financial markets—from New York and London, to Moscow and Hong Kong—have only made matters worse.

As a result of all this, trans-national friendships are shifting, as interests diverge and comprehensive alternatives are postulated. Many nations are re-defining their strategic priorities. Something like a sense of acute uncertainty about the future is being felt throughout the world.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

One geo-strategic theatre that is uniquely affected by the unforeseen global changes of 2008 is Europe.

I say “uniquely affected” because Europe not only has to respond to external political and economic convulsions; it has to respond to singularly complicated internal developments as well. The European Union is not a nation-state like Japan, or a confederation like Switzerland. Neither is it an experiment in representative democracy like the United States that Alexis de Tocqueville so brilliantly described. The EU is a new political form, in which a growing number of established democratic countries freely pool their sovereignty to create something novel and untested: an entity that is more than an alliance, and less than a country.

Of course, there is no doubt that the European project has, since its inception, built up its credibility by delivering lasting peace and sustainable prosperity. But the truth also is that decision-making has become overly bureaucratized, whilst recent efforts at reform have not yet born fruit. In short, the noble construct of soft power that is the EU has entered into a seemingly profound crisis of confidence. Institutional malaise and enlargement fatigue are amongst the symptoms of the democratic deficit Europeans are becoming all too familiar with.

What makes the present moment particularly challenging for the European Union is the tight convergence of these and many other factors in very arduous times. It is not my intention to discuss ways out of this quagmire this morning, but rather to focus on its impending effects on the Western Balkans.

There is a danger that our region ends up a casualty of the inopportune state of affairs facing the European Union. And standing at the center of the Western Balkans is this country.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

For Serbia, the year 2008 will be remembered as a very, very difficult one as well. We too have felt the aftershocks of the global economic turndown. More profoundly, we have become caught at the heart of one of the most dangerous challenges to the nature of the international system since the founding of the United Nations.

I speak of the February 17^th unilateral declaration of independence by the ethnic Albanian authorities of our southern province of Kosovo and Metohija—an act that is in direct violation of our Constitution, the United Nations Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

Anchored by the results of two historic elections that confirmed our determination to move towards Europe, the Republic of Serbia responded to this grave crisis—to this attempt at forcible partition—with maximal restraint. We ruled out the use of force. And we did not exercise other unilateral options, such as the imposition of economic sanctions, against our breakaway province.

We sought a non-confrontational way to respond to UDI. And we found it. Working to overcome this political assault on our sovereignty and territorial integrity, we demanded that justice be delivered through the proper legal means at the disposal of any member State of the United Nations. We chose to use the law.

We asked the General Assembly to refer the issue of the legality of Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence to the International Court of Justice—and the General Assembly did just that, this past October 8^th.

The result is that for the first time in the history of our region, an issue of such fundamental importance and complexity—passionately involving all at once identity, boundaries, communal rights, opposing historical narratives—has been steered clear of resorting to the force of arms.

Relegating the status issue to the international judicial arena is but the first in a series of steps designed to create an environment in which lasting peace and stability can be secured.

The second has to do with restoring legitimacy to international action.

The framework for the status-neutral administration of our southern province remains resolution 1244 (1999). Any attempt to change this legal fact without the approval of the Security Council threatens to pull us back into the orbit of a very dangerous foreign policy doctrine that I hope was put to rest by the voters of America just a few days ago.

Its unpopularity became universal—and its danger to world peace, almost self-evident. Yet there are some who still believe it can lead to success in Kosovo.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

International missions that operate without the consent of the Security Council have become known as “coalitions of the willing.”

Those that are “willing” oppose themselves to those that are “unwilling.” At least in the Balkans, it has been proven to be a recipe for disaster.

In the period of time since the ICJ was given the task of issuing an advisory opinion on the legality of Kosovo’s UDI, Serbia has re-doubled its efforts to ensure that this doctrine will no longer have a voice—at least on our regional stage.

That is why we have engaged in a dialogue with the United Nations on the reconfiguration of the international civilian presence in our southern province. We are close to arriving at an agreement that can be confirmed by the Security Council.

Should we fail, we may face a series of dangerous, uncoordinated outcomes on the ground. And, more broadly, the re-embrace of a rules-based system to frame conduct in the 21^st-century international arena would not be secured.

I say: it is time to set aside once and for all the outdated, zero-sum approach to regional politics in which a winner and a loser insecurely emerge from each dispute—the winner because he feels unable to secure his triumph, the loser because he feels he must avenge the defeat he believes to have been unjust.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Serbia is a country proud of its history. Our democratic leadership is completely dedicated to pursuing policies that will propel the region generationally forward. That is why the central strategic priority of the Republic of Serbia is rapid accession to the European Union.

Serbia wants to join the EU, not only for reasons of geography, heritage, and economic prosperity, but also because of the values we hold in common. These values constitute the intangible excellence of 21^st-century Europe, and they form the foundation of our democracy, our efforts at reconciliation, and our beliefs in what we can accomplish.

What is of great significance is that Europe has become the unifying force of the region: my country’s absolute dedication to join the EU is shared by all the countries of the Western Balkans.

This is the third step in the creation of lasting peace and stability in the region: by choosing—as democracies—to belong to something that is greater than the sum of its parts, the Balkanization of the Balkans can be reversed.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

How to achieve this is the overarching theme of this conference. What I would like to do is frame this theme in a broader context. And I’m afraid that the forward linear trajectory we all had hoped to see become a reality in the near future could turn out to be less likely to come into being than we might wish.

I still believe, however, that we have grounds for cautious optimism. If we work together—if all the stakeholders in the success to come act in concert, then not only can we maintain our pace, but we can all get to the finish line faster than anyone thinks is possible.

I don’t believe there is anyone in this room who hasn’t repeated the mantra that Serbia’s place is in the European Union—who hasn’t said in the course of his or her conversations that all the countries of the Western Balkans must join the EU.

But rarely does one take a serious look at the strategic framework informing the promise made at the Thessaloniki Summit of 2003, where the European future of the Western Balkans was first clearly stated.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The Western Balkans is the only place where EU enlargement can take place, realistically, in this generation. There may be others, but the integration of those geographies is, for various causes, pretty far off.

Now, the Western Balkans has two geographical edges: Croatia and Turkey. For a number of reasons we are all familiar with, it seems pretty safe to assume that Croatia is in, and Turkey is out—at least in this generation. Long term, who knows? But as Keynes used to say, in the long term, we’re all dead.

In my view, what happens to the countries in-between Croatia and Turkey primarily depends on the direction in which Serbia will end up walking towards.

We are a country uniquely placed to act as the region’s accession accelerator. And I think there is no doubt that Serbia’s success would ensure the irreversibility of the transformative processes that have the potential to inject our corner of Europe with such vitality, economic development, and hope for a secure future.

And I think there is equally no doubt that without Serbia leading the way, places like Bosnia, Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia will not be able to truly consolidate their European futures—should they end up being offered, in the absence of a concrete proposal of membership to Serbia.

The question then is: will Serbia gravitate towards Croatia, or Turkey—will we enter the House of Europe, or will we remain bitterly at its gates? This is the fundamental question. And I want to spend the remaining portion of my time with you this morning exploring various aspects of this issue—which is, in my view, the fourth and final step in the creation of lasting peace and stability in the Western Balkans.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me begin by saying clearly that never in the history of Serbia have we had a more pro-European government than that of Boris Tadic. Never have we been in a better position to deliver on our commitments and our promises. Never have we been more able to commence the sprint to the finish line of Europe.

And why have we not done so? Why are we not closer? Why is there a sense that an opportunity is about to be missed—the best regional opportunity ever to come along?

My answer is because Serbia is, unfortunately, not being treated like other EU membership aspirants in the Western Balkans. We seem to be held to a different set of standards.

Don’t you just get the feeling that when the EU looks to Serbia, it says: sui generis? It’s not just the Copenhagen criteria, is it?

First we had the additional constraint of a very harshly conceived definition of full cooperation with the ICTY, where more recently full compliance has come to mean delivering Mladic—even if there is no hard evidence whatsoever that he is currently in Serbia. And then, after incredible external pressure was put on our neighbors to recognize Kosovo’s UDI— creating new regional fissures—we are asked to pretend that everything is business as usual. And now, some even try to insinuate that Serbia’s recognition of Kosovo should be yet another pre-condition for candidacy status.

The time has come to say: “enough is enough.”

Yes, Serbia does face a unique set of challenges—and believe me, we’re very much aware of them. But instead of helping us overcome them, it looks like some are creating new obstacles for us to jump over.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

If you take one thing away from this speech, I would like it to be that Serbia demands to be treated like any other Thessaloniki aspirant.

I think we deserve it. And if we get it, I think we can make it. And I think we can make it in record time.

So here is what I propose.

Let us get rid of the extra conditionality, and un-freeze the Interim Agreement by the end of this year.

Let us make 2009 the year that Serbia is put on the White Schengen List, and the year we achieve Official Candidacy Status.

Let’s just do those three things—together, as partners aiming at a common future. I tell you: Serbia will do its part. And I tell you also: release us from out-of-date perceptions, and watch just how fast we can go.

The point of no return is within reach. Let us have the courage, and the vision, to make it happen. Right now.

Thank you for your attention.

Mr. Chairman,

Excellencies,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I thank you for the opportunity to address the Permanent Council this afternoon.

The OSCE represents a unique forum—at once pan-European and Trans-Atlantic—in which participating states can define and explain their positions in the context of the broader European security agenda.

Tracing its origins back to the period of détente, it was constructed to help bring about the end of the Cold War. Ultimately, it did.

Some predicted the end of history would follow.

Perhaps it will one day, but that day is not yet upon us. The zero-sum, adversarial approach to international relations is re-gaining strength throughout the world and has begun to re-surface in the OSCE space.

But we must not fail. The stakes are too high, and the potential consequences too grave, for us to discard the principles by which we have been managing our actions and our relationships since 1975.

While it may be very difficult to achieve it globally, I believe that if this generation re-dedicates itself to the cause, we can forge the end of history in Europe.

Mr. Chairman,

I believe the moment to try again is now. Recent events within the European space suggest that we cannot afford to simply move from crisis to crisis, issue to issue, without a principled commitment to apply a standard acceptable to all.

If we look beyond the present discord, we see that the framework designed to bring us together is still there. We need only to turn back to the foundational document of the international system: the United Nations Charter. It remains a beacon for all—a sure guide in troubled times.

And for us here present, we have the advantage of an enriching addition to the framework of 1945: the Helsinki Final Act. The importance of the judicious application of its enshrined principles has rarely been more evident.

Mr. Chairman,

Let us be frank with each other: The unilateral declaration of independence by the Kosovo Albanians is a prima facia violation of the UN Charter, the Helsinki Final Act, and UN Security Council resolution 1244 (1999).

When we last met, I spoke of the precedent that could arise from the abject failure of the Kosovo Albanians to embrace the 21^st century principles of Europe—namely compromise, concession, and consensus-building. I shared my fear with you that the unilateral imposition of outcomes to ethnic conflicts could create very troubling consequences to the community of democracies that is the OSCE, or even beyond. I spoke of what the fanning of secessionist flames could produce. And I expressed deep concern about what could result from the attempt to forcibly partition a sovereign, democratic state like Serbia.

It gives me no pleasure to conclude that some of what I had then laid before you as the likely consequences of Kosovo’s UDI has come to pass.

The fabric of security and cooperation in Europe has been damaged. The dominos are starting to fall.

But there is still time to prevent the worst of these from spinning beyond our control.

Mr. Chairman,

Let me share with you how Serbia intends to keep contributing to the restoration of stability in our part of the OSCE space in the aftermath of Kosovo’s UDI.

We continue to maintain that the sine qua non of the legitimacy of the international system is the respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of internationally-recognized states.

Serbia has ruled out the use of force against its breakaway province. And Serbia has not exercised other unilateral options such as the imposition of economic sanctions.

Instead, we have opted for a peaceful and diplomatic, yet energetic approach—the result of which is that a vast majority of UN member States have refrained from recognizing Kosovo’s UDI. They have continued to abide by international obligations to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of my country.

On behalf of the Republic of Serbia, allow me once again to sincerely thank these countries for their adherence to the principles of international law.

Mr. Chairman,

A part of our diplomatic approach to securing peace and stability in the Western Balkans centers on an initiative we have put before the next General Assembly of the United Nations.

Serbia has submitted a draft resolution to be considered at the forthcoming 63^rd Session. This document refrains from taking political positions on Kosovo's UDI. Rather, in simple and direct language, it asks of the principal judicial organ of the United Nations—the International Court of Justice—to render an advisory opinion on the following question: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?”

Numerous benefits would result from referring this matter to the ICJ.

On the regional front, we believe that a number of relationships could begin to be restored to health. Serbia intends to work with the region and other stakeholders to ensure the creation of much-needed political space to concentrate on what unites us instead of what drives us apart.

From the perspective of the international system, sending the Kosovo question to the ICJ would prevent it from serving as a deeply problematic precedent in any part of the globe where secessionist ambitions are harbored. It would provide politically neutral yet judicially authoritative guidance to many countries still deliberating on how to approach Kosovo’s UDI in line with international law.

I come to the final reason why it is proper for the General Assembly to support Serbia’s request to obtain an advisory opinion from the ICJ. It has to do with the vital international principle at stake: the right of any member State of the United Nations to pose a simple, elementary question—on a matter it considers vitally important—to the competent court. To vote against this resolution is in effect to vote to deny the right of any country to seek judicial recourse through the UN system.

Mr. Chairman,

I turn now to a further contribution by Serbia to securing peace and stability in the Western Balkans: arriving at a functional arrangement for a reconfigured United Nations-led presence in Kosovo.

The European Union has committed itself to building the much-needed institutional and societal fabric of our southern province. And I want to make it clear that as a general principle my country supports the deepening of Europe’s engagement in any part of Serbia, including Kosovo.

In order for Europe’s presence in Kosovo to be fully secured within an acceptable, legitimate framework, it is vital that its mandate be approved by the Security Council. It must operate within the framework of Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) and be clearly based on the principle of status-neutrality, as well as fall under the ultimate authority of the UN. In this way, any lingering issues about the implementation of the Ahtisaari Proposal would be resolved once and for all.

Let me be unambiguous about this: The Ahtisaari Proposal was rejected by the Republic of Serbia. It was not approved by the Security Council. It has no legal standing.

Therefore it cannot contribute to any constructive, legitimate, and forward-looking plan designed to anchor the European Union’s presence within our southern province of Kosovo.

I want to clearly emphasize Serbia’s conviction that a consensual result on the framework of Europe’s presence in our southern province can be achieved in the near future. Let there be no doubt: Serbia will work hard with the international community to try and construct an outcome we can all support.

Mr. Chairman,

I turn to the subject of OMIK, one of the two OSCE missions operating on our territory. I begin by drawing attention to two recently released reports by our Organization that paint a realistically bleak picture of the reality of Kosovo today. The first, entitled “Four Years Later”, is a candid and comprehensive indictment of the Kosovo police and judicial system, in particular its failure to truly call to account the organizers and perpetrators of the March 2004 pogrom against the Kosovo Serbs and the Serbian Orthodox Church.

The second—“Human Rights, Ethnic Relations and Democracy in Kosovo”—covers the period from Summer 2007 to Summer 2008, that is to say, the pre- and post-UDI period. The conclusion one can draw from it is that very little has changed. From corruption to organized crime, property rights to the return of IDPs, UDI has not changed the grim reality of failure.

The judicial backlog has swelled, whilst the few judgments that are handed down seem to suffer from an inherent inability to punish the guilty.

Human rights have not improved—in fact, they have gotten worse. Just recall the terrible crime of cultural cleansing that took place a few months ago in the town of Djakovica: concrete was laid on the remains of a church that was heavily damaged in March 2004, and a park was built on top of it.

The same goes for a recent incident in the town of Decani, home of a UNESCO World Heritage Site that is also on its List of World Heritage in Danger. Ten potential returnees were physically and verbally assaulted in the Municipal building a few weeks ago.

Those were just a few examples of an endemic problem.

In truth, if you go back and look at the OSCE reporting, you won’t see them mentioned. According to the local field office dailies, it never happened. And the church was never paved over, either.

I raise, therefore, the core issues of OMIK’s objectivity, accuracy and hiring practices, and note with grave concern the strong impression of Kosovo’s Serbian community—especially in the enclaves—that OMIK, in particular its field offices, has lost its confidence.

Ultimately, before we can even begin to talk of reinforcing OMIK’s 1244-based role in our southern province, we must insist on stricter scrutiny, greater accountability, and absolute transparency. And we must take seriously the long-standing OSCE practice that the host country be fully consulted in the Head of Mission selection process.

Mr. Chairman,

Regretfully, I must say that Serbia, as the host country, was not adequately consulted by the Chairmanship.

We continue to support the candidate put forward by the Swiss Confederation.

We believe the only remedy to this stalemate is to begin anew. Serbia therefore requests of the Finnish Chairmanship to swiftly call for new nominations to be proposed by the participating States.

We recognize that time is short, but believe the window of opportunity to do the right thing remains open.

I assure all here present that the Republic of Serbia remains dedicated to act in a constructive and cooperative manner. We look forward to working with the Chairmanship, the Secretary General, the Troika and the participating States. I am confident that a rapid consensus will emerge on the most suitable candidate for the job, paving the way for his or her appointment, free of controversy.

Mr. Chairman,

In conclusion I say: The only prosperous destiny for the Western Balkans manifestly lies in the European Union.

This is the context within which the new Government of the Republic of Serbia operates. And so while we retain a steadfast commitment to the preservation of our sovereignty and territorial integrity, I want to emphasize to you that the strategic priority of the new Serbian Government is the accelerated march toward full European Union membership, together with the consolidation of regional peace and stability.

The reason is elementary: The Republic of Serbia has strong faith in the power of the 21^st-century values of Europe, and in their ability to reconcile former rivals and adversaries.

Allow me to draw attention, therefore, to the decisive steps the new Government of Serbia has taken to reaffirm our full cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia.

We have moved swiftly in demonstrating our commitment to fulfill both our domestic and international legal obligation. It advances our political aim to achieve comprehensive reconciliation with all our neighbors. And it also highlights our moral imperative to the victims, to ourselves, and—most of all—to the generations to come: the ultimate beneficiaries of our efforts and our commitments.

Mr. Chairman,

I end as I began: Enough harm has been caused by the various intrusions against the values that stand at the foundation of the institution that brings us here today.

We have to change tacks and find our bearings again. The healing must begin. And the restoration of trust must follow.

It will not be easy—it never has been. For peace and security must be won and secured time and again. Sincere political commitments must be made, sovereign equality must be respected, and hard work must follow.

Let that be our common cause and our impetus for renewal—as we realign ourselves and our actions with the founding principles of this Organization and the United Nations, upon which it rests.

The time to begin fulfilling the promise of the end of history in Europe is now.

Thank you very much for your attention.